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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
tractual liability, and that the act does not apply to injuries received out-
side of the state. Under the optional type, however, the general holding
is that the liability is contractual, and hence that the law of the place of
making the contract governs irrespective of where the injury occurs. (This
is the type of the Missouri Act.) The provisions of the compensation act
are construed as written into the contract of employment. The Michigan
case cited above sums up the point in these words: "The contract was to
be performed within and without the state. . . . The rights, being con-
tractual, accompanied the employee wherever he went within the ambit of
his employment."
The annotation mentioned in 18 A. L. R. is quite comprehensive, and
further expansion here is useless. Quotations from three cases, however,
are valuable in enunciating the reasons for liability under optional statutes
such as Missouri's, resulting in such decisions as the principal case.
In Deeney v. Wright, etc Co., 36 N. J. L. 121, it is said:
"The statute can have no extraterritorial effect, but it can require a con-
tract to be made by two parties to a hiring that the contract shall have
extraterritorial effect. . . . It would seem that the reasonable construc-
tion of the statute is that it writes into the contract of employment certain
additional terms. The cause of action of petitioner is ex contractu. The
lex loci contractus governs the construction of the contract and determines
the legal obligations arising from it."
Pierce v. Belkins Van & Storage Go. (1919), 185 Iowa 1346, 172 N. W.
191, says:
"But that the statute is elective has controlling bearing on one thing
that is most highly important. Where the statute is elective as to both
employer and employee, payment of compensation is not the performance
of a statutory duty, but the performance of conditions in the contract of
hiring, which conditions are in the contract by means of reading the Com-
pensation statute into the contract."
Rounsaville v. Central R. Co. (1915), 87 N. J. L. 371, 94 A. 392, adds this:
"The place where the accident occurs is of no more relevance than is the
place of accident to the assured in an action on a contract of accident in-
surance, or the place of death of the assured in an action on a contract of
life insurance." D. A. M., '29.
PuBLic UTnITms--ELEcTRiciTY.--A tenant of a realty company claimed
the latter was charging excessive rates for electricity and prayed inter-
ference of the court. The realty company confined its service to tenants
and employees. Held, the realty company was not a "public utility," and
the court could fix the rate at which electricity is to be furnished. Jonas V.
Swetland Co. (1928), 119 Ohio St. 12, 162 N. E. 45.
This case brings up the problem of when a company supplying electricity
becomes a public utility. In the absence of statutory provision, the test at
common law must be applied: whether the company has held itself out as
ready to serve the public generally. It is the voluntary use of one's prop-
erty in such a manner as to make it of public consequence that gives the
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public the right to control its use. Producers' Transportation Co. v. The
Railroad Commission (1917), 176 Cal. 499, 169 P. 59, 61. The doctrine up-
on which the principal case probably proceeds is laid down in another Ohio
case, Southern Ohio Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission (1924), 110
Ohio St. 246, 143 N. E. 700. To constitute a "public utility" the devotion
to public use must be of such character that the product and service are
available to the public generally and indiscriminately, or there must be
the acceptance by the utility of public franchises or a calling to its aid
of the police power of the state. It is still easier to concur with the result
reached in the principal case when the logic of Pinney and Boyle Co. v. Los
Angeles Gas & Elec. Corp. (1914), 168 Cal. 12, 141 P. 620, is applied. "Of
course it is true that if A has erected a power plant and has agreed to sell
a portion of his electricity to his neighbor B, he is not devoting his property to
a public service. But if A shall have erected his power plant and shall have of-
fered to sell his power to the whole or a defined portion of the community, he is,
to that extent, devoting his property to public use." Each case must depend
for determination on its own particular facts. It is hard to lay down any
steadfast rules. Brock v. Miller (1927), 240 Mich. 667, 216 N. W. 385, is a
border line case. There it was held that the proprietor of a summer resort
who sells cottage lots and undertakes to supply lot owners with water and
light, engages in a public service, which makes it his duty to serve all pa-
trons alike. But in Story v. Richardson (1921), 186 Cal. 162, 198 P. 1057,
the owner of an office building maintaining within it a plant to furnish elec-
tricity to its occupants, and selling a small surplus to occupants of neighbor-
ing property, was held not to be operating a public utility. That decision
accords with the principal case. The most important Missouri case dealing
with the subject is State ex rel. Danciger & Co. v. Public Service Com.
(1918), 275 Mo. 483, 205 S. W. 36. A corporation which undertook to fur-
nish surplus electric current generated by it for use in its plant, to the own-
ers of neighboring property, who strung their own wires, and to the city for
a few lights, was held not to be a public utility. It is doubtful whether such
a case as the principal one would arise in Missouri, since the Public Service
Commission Act defines an electrical corporation, and expressly excepts a
situation "where electricity is generated or distributed by the producer
solely on or through private property for railroad or street railroad pur-
poses or for its own use or for the use of its tenants and not for sale to
others." But in view of the cases cited it will be observed that even this
exception could not always help to a determination of such a problem.
J. J. C., '30.
TREATIES--CONSTRUCTION AND OPERATION OF PARTICULAR PROVISIONS-
TRADE AND COMMERCE WITHIN THE SCOPE OF THE TREATY WITH JAPAN OF
FEB. 21, 1911.-Citizens of Japan instituted mandamus proceedings to com-
pel the Secretary of the State of California to file articles of incorporation
for a hospital, based on respondent's rights under the treaty between the
United States and Japan (1911), 37 Stat. 1504, which authorizes citizens
of Japan to carry on trade within the United States and "to lease land for
residential and commercial purposes, and generally to do anything incident
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